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An attribute-based signature with respect to a signing policy chosen by the signer, con-
vinces the verier that the signer sustains a subset of attributes satisfying that signing
policy. The verier must not obtain any other information about the identity of the signer
or the attributes he holds. This type of signatures have a lot of applications in real life
scenarios that demand both authentication and privacy properties. The ability of revoking
users that have misbehaved or lost their attributes, so that they can not compute more
valid signatures, is very desirable for real life applications of attribute-based signatures.
In this project, the main goal consists in studying dierent protocols of revocation and
incorporating them into an already existing RSA attribute-based signature. In order to
achieve these objectives, two dierent protocols were chosen from those available in the
literature, taking into account the eciency of the existing protocols and the necessity
that the protocol is built in an anonymous way: the user must not reveal his identity
when proving that he is not in the revocation list.
The rst one is based on a polynomial evaluation argument, and some of its main advan-
tages are that this argument has logarithmic communication cost in the number of revoked
users in contrast to other protocols with cubic root complexity at best, thus obtaining a
more ecient protocol and besides its security relies only on the discrete logarithm as-
sumption.
The second one was based on a protocol for special cases when the revoked elements are
coprime, since in the attribute based signature the elements are prime, this protocol was
considered suitable. While demonstrating its soundness it was found that the original pro-
tocol was not secure because we found a particular attack (that we describe in this work).
Thus, a new secure protocol was designed which ts with the attribute-based signature.
Finally, the previous protocols have been incorporated into an existing RSA attribute-
based signature scheme, and both resulting signatures have been analyzed in terms of
eciency of the communication cost. The second protocol is shown to be always more
ecient than the rst one, even for the case with a single revoked user.
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Una signatura basada en atributs en relacio amb una poltica de signatures triada pel
signant, convenc al vericador que el signant te un subconjunt d'atributs que satisfan la
poltica de signatures. El vericador no obtindra cap informacio sobre la identitat del
signatari o sobre els atributs que te. Aquest tipus de signatures te moltes aplicacions en
situacions de la vida real que demanden autenticacio i privacitat al mateix temps. L'ha-
bilitat per revocar usuaris que s'han comportat malament o han perdut els seus atributs
i ja no poden computar mes signatures valides, es molt desitjable per a aplicacions de
signatures basades en atributs en la vida real.
En aquest projecte, el principal objectiu consisteix a estudiar diferents protocols de revo-
cacio i incorporar-los en un esquema signatura RSA basada en atributs ja existent. Per
poder aconseguir aquests objectius, dos protocols van ser triats entre els disponibles en
la literatura existent, tenint en compte l'eciencia dels protocols existents i la necessitat
que el protocol hagi estat construt de manera anonima: l'usuari no pot revelar la seva
identitat en el moment de provar que ell no esta en la llista de revocacio.
El primer protocol esta basat en un argument d'avaluacio de polinomis, i algun dels seus
principals avantatges es que te cost de comunicacio logartmica en el nombre d'usuaris re-
vocats en contrast amb altres protocols amb complexitat cubica en el millor cas, per tant
s'obte un protocol mes ecient i a mes la seva seguretat depen solament de la conjectura
del logaritme discret.
El segon protocol esta basat en un protocol per a situacions especials quan els elements de
la llista de revocacio son coprimers, com en la signatura basada en atributs els elements
son primers, aquest protocol va ser considerat com a adient. Mentre s'estava demostrant
la solidesa del protocol ens vam adonar que el protocol original no era segur perque vam
trobar un atac (que esta descrit en el projecte). Per tant, un nou protocol segur va ser
dissenyat que serveix per a la signatura basada en atributs.
Finalment, els protocols previs han sigut incorporats a la signatura RSA basada en atri-
buts existent, i les dues signatures resultants han sigut analitzades en termes de l'eciencia
del cost de comunicacio. El segon protocol es demostra que sempre es mes ecient que el
primer, ns i tot en el cas d'un sol usuari revocat.
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Una rma basada en atributos con relacion a una poltica de rmas elegida por el rmante,
convence al vericador que el rmante tiene un subconjunto de atributos que satisfacen la
poltica de rmas. El vericador no obtendra ninguna informacion sobre la identidad del
rmante o sobre los atributos que tiene. Este tipo de rmas tiene muchas aplicaciones en
situaciones de la vida real que demandan autenticacion y privacidad al mismo tiempo.
La habilidad para revocar a usuarios que se han comportado mal o han perdido sus atri-
butos y ya no pueden computar mas rmas validas, es muy deseable para aplicaciones de
rmas basadas en atributos en la vida real.
En este proyecto, el principal objetivo consiste en estudiar diferentes protocolos de revo-
cacion e incorporarlos a un esquema de una rma RSA basada en atributos ya existente.
Para poder alcanzar estos objetivos, dos protocolos fueron elegidos entre los disponibles
en la literatura existente, teniendo en cuenta la eciencia de los protocolos existentes y
la necesidad de que el protocolo haya sido construido de manera anonima: el usuario no
puede revelar su identidad en el momento de probar que el no esta en la lista de revo-
cacion.
El primer protocolo esta basado en un argumento de evaluacion de polinomios, y una de
sus principales ventajas es que tiene coste de comunicacion logartmica en el numero de
usuarios revocados en contraste con otros protocolos con complejidad cubica en el mejor
caso, por lo tanto se obtiene un protocolo mas eciente y ademas su seguridad solo de-
pende de la conjetura del logaritmo discreto.
El segundo protocolo esta basado en un protocolo para situaciones especiales cuando los
elementos en la lista de revocacion son numeros coprimos dos a dos, como en la rma
basada en atributos los elementos son primos, este protocolo fue considerado como una
buena posibilidad. Mientras se estaba demostrando la solidez del protocolo nos dimos
cuenta que el protocolo original no era seguro porque encontramos un ataque (que esta
descrito en el proyecto). Por lo tanto, un nuevo protocolo seguro fue dise~nado que sirve
para la rma basada en atributos.
Finalmente, los protocolos previos fueron han sido incorporados a la rma RSA basada
en atributos existente, y las dos rmas resultantes han sido analizadas en terminos de la
eciencia del coste de comunicacion. El segundo protocolo se demuestra que siempre es
mas eciente que el primero, incluso en el caso de un solo usuario revocado.

Notation
N Natural numbers
Z Integer numbers
N = PQ RSA modulus
() Euler Function
ZN Set of integers less than N and relative prime to N
QR(N) Set of quadratic residues modulo N
RSA.Inst RSA generated probabilistic algorithm
neg() Negligible function
A Polynomial time adversary
PKfg Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
P Prover
V Verier
H Hash function
S Probability space
cx Pedersen commitment of x
x R S Chosen at random according to S
P Set of Attributes
(P; ) Signing Policy
; 1; 2 2 N Security parameters
 Set of integers in the interval [21   22 + 1; 21 + 22   1]
O() Communication complexity
L Revocation list
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Attribute-based cryptography has emerged in the last years as a powerful tool to
handle the privacy issues that have appeared in the last decades with the expansion
of computer technologies. An attribute-based signature can only be acomplished
by an user who holds a subset of attributes that satises some policy. The most
important property of this type of signatures is that a successful execution will not
leak any information about the identity of the user or the attributes that he holds,
apart from the fact that these attributes satisfy the given policy.
Attribute-based signatures were introduced expressly in the rst version of [21]. In
an attribute-based signature scheme, each user receives from a master entity a se-
cret key which depends on the attributes that he holds. Later on a user can choose
a signing policy (a family of subsets of attributes) satised by his attributes, and
use his secret key to compute a signature on a message, for this signing policy. The
verier of the signature is positive that some user holding a set of attributes satisfy-
ing the signing policy is the author of the signature, but the verier will not obtain
any other information about the actual identity of the signer or the attributes he
holds. In addition to the general applications of any attribute-based cryptosystem
such as private access control, this specic type of signature have many applications
in scenarios where both authentication and privacy properties are desired, such as
the leakage of secrets and anonymous polls.
The attribute-based signature scheme that we consider in this project was designed
by Herranz [18] and is the rst attribute-based signature scheme that employs
RSA-like keys and operations; particularly, it is the rst scheme that does not
need bilinear pairings. The main advantage of using RSA attribute-based signa-
ture schemes is that it is more desirable to design cryptographic protocols that use
keys and operations with RSA so as to benet from the very specialized hardware
and software optimizations available.
Including revocation of users into an attribute-based signature scheme would be
imperative so as to use it in real-life scenarios where users want to maintain a cer-
tain level of privacy. In cases where a user misbehaves or loses his attributes, it is
compulsory to have the option of revoking these users from the system. Because
of the privacy property, implementing revocation into attribute-based signatures is
not trivial in the least.
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Analyzing dierent methods of revocation and their possible incorporation into the
above mentioned RSA attribute-based signature is the main goal of this project.
Furthermore, analyzing the eciency of the resulting protocols and their main ad-
vantages and disadvantages will be discussed. In order to do that, dierent methods
and papers on the topic were read through to nd the more ecient ones and also to
acknowledge the dierent cryptographic assumptions and concepts needed to carry
out this project.
In Chapter 2, a number of cryptographic assumptions and mathematical concepts
are introduced that will be used during the dissertation. Moreover, the main secu-
rity properties and their relation to other properties of attribute-based signatures
are laid out. Additionally, the Pedersen and Fujisaki Okamoto commitment schemes
which are used several times in this project and some of their main properties are
described.
In Chapter 3, the concept of interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is in-
troduced, and the main properties and some examples are described. Also, the
concept of non-interactive proof of knowledge is introduced and its obtaining with
hash functions is exemplied by means of what is called Schnorr signatures.
In Chapter 4, an extensive description of the algorithms that form an attribute-
based signature is presented. Moreover, the RSA attribute-based signature scheme
proposed in [18] which is the particular one that revocation will be incorporated
to is described.
In Chapter 5 we describe the rst method to incorporate revocation. It is based in
a polynomial evaluation argument developed by Bayer and Groth [4], which was
chosen because it is the rst one to have logarithmic communication cost in the
degree of the polynomial. Some additional modications were added in order to
apply it to considered the attribute-based signature scheme.
After designing the rst protocol, the original purpose was to implement it practi-
cally, but when comparing the protocol with the one in [15] based on accumulators,
we found that if the revocation list is made public (a feature which is necessary
when using [4], but which was not used in [15]), then a more ecient protocol could
be found using the basic idea of accumulators but without the necessity of a master
entity that maintains the accumulator. The most ecient way to implement this
new idea that we found in the literature was to use a protocol described by Peng
and Bao [23], but while implementing the protocol we realized that the protocol
in [23] is not secure: we found a particular attack against it, which is described in
Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7, we describe a modication of the protocol in [23] in order to achieve
the necessary security properties and also some changes to adapt the Peng and Bao
protocol to our attribute-based signature scheme, as our revocation list consists of
prime numbers and some steps can be simplied.
Finally, in Chapter 8, both protocols described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, are
incorporated into the RSA attribute-based signature described in Chapter 4. An
analysis of the communication cost of both protocols is performed, and for the most
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ecient protocol, an eciency analysis of the resulting attribute-based signature
scheme with revocation is done, in order to know how expensive the addition of the
revocation property will result. Finally, we compare it with the protocols described
in [15] to see how much more ecient the new protocol is.
At last, in Chapter 9, the conclusions of the project are outlined and furthermore
an option for future work related to this project is described.

Chapter 2
Mathematical Settings and Assump-
tions
In this chapter, some number-theoretic assumptions, mathematical concepts and
cryptographic schemes are introduced which will appear in the development of this
project.
1. Number-Theoretic assumptions
The necessary mathematical parameters are generated using the RSA.Inst proba-
bilistic algorithm. RSA.Inst takes as input a security parameter  2 Z+, afterwards
picks two random prime numbers, P;Q, each one being =2-bits long, such that both
p = P 12 and q =
Q 1
2 are also prime. Let QR(N) = fz2modN j z 2 ZNg  ZN
be the set of quadratic residues modulo N . QR(N) is a cyclic group of order
pq. The algorithm RSA.Inst generates at random a generator g 2 QR(N) such
that QR(N) = hgi. An execution of this algorithm is denoted as (P;Q;N; g)  
RSA.Inst(1). The following mathematical problems in QR(N) will be the base of
the security analysis of the attribute-based signature scheme and revocation scheme.
The strong RSA assumption was independently proposed by Fujisaki and Okamoto
[16] and by Bari¢ and Ptzmann [3]. This new denition forties the widely ac-
cepted RSA assumption that nding eth-roots modulo N for any e > 1 is hard.
The formal denition can be seen hereunder:
Definition 1. (Strong RSA Problem) Given an RSA modulus N = PQ and a
random x  R ZN , the strong RSA problem consist in nding e > 1 and y 2 ZN ,
such that ye = xmodN
Assumption 1. (The Strong RSA Assumption) The Strong RSA Assumption af-
rms that the probability that any algorithmAsRSA solves the Strong RSA problem
in polynomial time is negligible in , the length in bits of the RSA modulus. This
implies that the probability decreases, as  increases, faster than the inverse of any
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polynomial. Formally, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm AsRSA,
Pr

(P;Q;N;G) RSA.Inst(1); x R ZN ; (y; e) AsRSA(N;x) :
ye = x(modN) ^ 1 < e < N

= neg()
where neg() is a negligible function.
Lemma 1. For any integer N , given integers u; v 2 ZN and a; b 2 Z such that
ua = vbmodN and gcd(a; b) = 1, one can eciently compute x 2 ZN such that
xa = vmodN .
Proof. Since gcd(a; b) = 1, one can nd c; d 2 Z using the extended Euclidean
algorithm, such that bd = 1 + ac. Let x = (udv cmodN), then
xa = uadv ac = (ua)dv ac = (vb)dv ac = v(modN)
ut
Definition 2. (Decisional Die-Hellman Problem in QRN , with known factori-
sation)
Given the cyclic group QRN of order pq, which is obtained by the set of qua-
dratic residues modulo N; and a random generator g 2 QRN . An algorithm
ADDH resolves the Decisional Die-Hellman problem in QRN , with known fac-
torisation, if it is capable to distinguish between the two probability distributions
(N;P;Q; g; gxmodN; gy modN; gxy modN) and (N;P;Q; g; gxmodN; gy modN; gz modN),
where (P;Q;N; g) RSA.Inst(1) and x; y; z  R Zpq.
Assumption 2. (Decisional Die-Hellman Assumption) The DDH Assumption
in QRN , with known factorisation, arms that the success probability of any such
algorithm ADDH is negligible in . Formally, for any algorithm ADDH running in
polynomial time, the advantage, as seen below,Pr 1 ADDH(N;P;Q; g; gxmodN; gy modN; gxy modN);(P;Q;N; g) RSA.Inst(1);x; y  R Zpq:

() 
Pr

1 ADDH(N;P;Q; g; gxmodN; gy modN; gz modN);
(P;Q;N; g) RSA.Inst(1);x; y; z  R Zpq:

()

is negligible in the security parameter .
The following result is proved in the full version of [?]: the Decisional Die-Hellman
problem in QRN , with known factorisation, is equivalent to the Decisional Die-
Hellman problem in a cyclic subgroup of QRN of either prime order p or prime order
q. The Decisional Die-Hellman problem in a cyclic group of big prime order is
considered to be computationally hard, and therefore the Decisional Die-Hellman
Assumption in QRN , with known factorisation, makes perfect sense.
Definition 3. (The Discrete Logarithm Problem) Given a group QRN and a
generator g, produced by running the algorithm RSA.Inst(1), and given a random
element h 2 QRN , the discrete logarithm problem in QRN consists in nding an
integer x such that h = gxmodN .
Assumption 3. (The Discrete Logarithm Assumption) The discrete logarithm
assumption holds for QRN if for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time
algorithms ADLA,
Pr

(P;Q;N; g) RSA.Inst(1); h QRN ; x ADLA(N; g; h) : x 2 Z ^ gx = hmodN

= neg()
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where (P;Q;N; g)  RSA.Inst(1) is an algorithm that generates a RSA modulus
and neg() is a negligible function. The hardness of nding discrete logarithms
relies on the type of the group. In our case N = PQ, where P;Q are safe primes,
because they are obtained in a way that P = 2p+1, Q = 2q+1, where p; q are also
prime numbers. Using this type of prime numbers the discrete logarithm problem
in QRN cannot be eciently solved.
Lemma 2. Under the Strong RSA Assumption, if the adversary F is able to obtain
values L 2 QR(N), a1; a2; v1; v2 2 Z such that La1 a2 = gv1 v2 modN , then it
must hold v1 v2a1 a2 2 Z.
Proof. Lemma 2. Let d = gcd(v1   v2; a1   a2) be the largest integer dividing
both v1 v2 and a1 a2. This means (Euclides algorithm) that there exist integers
a; v 2 Z such that a(a1   a2) + v(v1   v2) = d. Let us assume, for the sake
of contradiction, that v1 v2a1 a2 =2 Z. Therefore, it must hold a1   a2 > d and, so,
e := a1 a2d > 1.
Now we have that g = g
a(a1 a2)+v(v1 v2)
d = gaeLve = (gaLv )
e
modN . There-
fore, we would solve an instance of the Strong RSA problem with input ! = g,
because gaLv is an e-th root of g, for e = a1 a2d > 1. This would contradict the
Strong RSA Assumption, and so we can conclude that v1 v2a1 a2 2 Z. ut
2. The Euclidean Algorithm
The Euclidean algorithm gives a method to eciently compute the greatest common
divisor of two integers a and b.
Considering that the divisors of an integer a are the same as those of  a, it is
sucient to consider the case in which a and b are both positive.
The method consists in performing the following divisions. It can be presumed that
in the rst n divisions the remainder is positive, while in the last one it is zero:
1: a = bq1 + r1; 0 < r1 < b;
2: b = r1q2 + r2; 0 < r2 < r1;
3: r1 = r2q3 + r3; 0 < r3 < r2;
...
...
...
i+ 2: ri = ri+1qi+2 + ri+2; 0 < ri+2 < ri+1;
...
...
...
n  1: rn 3 = rn 2qn 1 + rn 1; 0 < rn 1 < rn 2;
n: rn 2 = rn 1qn + rn; 0 < rn < rn 1;
n+ 1 rn 1 = rnqn+1 + 0:
Dividing in this way, a remainder equal to zero is found within at most b divisions,
since b > r1 > r2 > r3 >    > rn is a strictly decreasing sequence of non-negative
integers. It can be noted that the common divisors of a and b are the same ones
as the common divisors of b and r1, actually, if an integer divides both a and b,
it divides each multiple of b, and the dierence a   bq1 which is r1. On the other
hand, if an integer divides b and r1, it also divides a = bq1 + r1. Using the second
equation, the common divisors of b and r1 are the common divisors of r1 and r2.
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Proceeding with the following equations, it can be found that the common divisors
of a and b are the common divisors of rn 1 and rn. Since rn 1 is a multiple of rn,
the common divisors of rn 1 and rn are the divisors of rn.
The last remainder in the sequence of the divisions is dened as d = rn. d is a
common divisor of a and b. Furthermore, it is the greatest among the common
divisors of a and b, given that if d0 divides both a and b then d0 divides d as seen
before. d is dene as the greatest common divisor and the symbol gcd (a; b) denotes
it. If gcd (a; b) = 1, the numbers a and b are coprime, since they do not have non
trivial common divisors.
2.1. Bézout's identity. The Euclidean algorithm gives a way of proving that the
following relation holds:
gcd (a; b) = ka+ lb
with k and l suitable integers. The proof of this identity consists in showing that
all the remainders of the successive divisions can be written as combinations of a
and b. Given the following equations,
r1 = a  bq1
r2 = a  bq2
...
rn = rn 2   rn 1qn
It can be noted that,
r2 = b  r1q2 = b  (a  bq1)q2 = ( q2)a+ (1 + q1q2)b
This means, that r1 and r2 can be written as combinations of a and b. Thus r3
being a combination with integer coecients of r1 and r2, is also a combination
with integer coecients of a and b. At last, d = rn is a combination with integer
coecients of rn 1 and rn 2, and so of a and b.
Proposition 3. Let a and b be two positive integers. They are coprime if and only
if there exist two integers k; l such that
ka+ lb = 1
Proof. If a and b are coprime, gcd (a; b) = 1 and the armation follows from the
Bézout's identity.
On the other hand, lets suppose ka + lb = 1 holds. If d is a common divisor of a
and b, then d divides ka+ lb too, and so divides 1. Hence d = 1 or d =  1, ergo a
and b are relatively prime. ut
3. The Pedersen and Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitments
Scheme
The Pedersen commitment scheme [22], and the variant of Fujisaki-Okamoto for
groups with unknown order, are used several times in this project. The security the
scheme provides is based on the discrete logarithm assumption. Pedersen described
his scheme in groups of prime and public order. Here we detail the variant proposed
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by Fujisaki-Okamoto [16], for groups of unknown order.
The probabilistic algorithm G(1) with security parameter , chooses two random
prime numbers, P;Q of length =2-bits long, where p = P 12 and q =
Q 1
2 are also
prime. Let QR(N) = fz2modN jz 2 ZNg  ZN be the set of quadratic residues
of modulo N . QR(N) is a cyclic group of order pq and the algorithm generates
random generators g; h 2 QR(N) such that QR(N) = hgi, QR(N) = hhi. To
commit to x 2 ZN the committer picks randomness r 2 ZN and computes
cx = g
xhrmodN
Both the Pedersen and Fujisaki Okamoto commitment schemes are computationally
binding under the discrete logarithm assumption, that is, a non-uniform probabilis-
tic polynomial time adversary A, given (g; h; cx), cannot nd x 6= x0 such that cx
is a valid commitment for both x and x0.
One of the main properties of both commitment schemes is that they are homo-
morphic. For all x; y and r; s the following equation holds
cxcy = g
xhrgyhs = gx+yhr+s = cx+y modN

Chapter 3
Proofs of Knowledge
1. Interactive Proofs of Knowledge
In cryptography, a proof of knowledge is an interactive proof in which the prover
succeeds 'convincing' a verier that it knows something, for instance, a solution of
an equation. The trivial solution consists in the prover sending to the verier what
he knows, and the verier authenticates it. But in some cases, the prover wants
to keep his information private, and just wants to prove the fact that he knows it;
this method receives the name of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
A so called zero-knowledge proof of knowledge allows a prover to demonstrate the
knowledge of a secret with respect to some public information such that no other
information is revealed in the process.
Some examples of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are:
 Given two graphs G;H, the prover wants to prove to the verier that G is
isomorphic to H, without revealing the isomorphism.
 Given a cyclic group G = h~gi and y 2 G, the prover wants to prove that he
knows x 2 Z such that ~gx = y, which is the discrete logarithm of y in basis ~g,
without revealing x.
 Given a public key pk, the prover wants to prove that he knows the matching
secret key sk, without revealing it. This is known as identication protocol.
1.1. Properties of a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge.
For any given zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, it satises the following proper-
ties. Let L be a language in nondeterministic polynomial-time, and given  2 L,
let W () be the set of witnesses of the fact that  2 L. The relation R can be
dened as R = f(; !) :  2 L; ! 2W ()g.
Given L and  which are public. The secret input for the prover may be the witness
!. The properties are:
 Completeness: if the prover knows ! such that (; !) 2 R, then the verier
always accepts the prover 's proof.
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 Proof of Knowledge: if the prover 's proofs for  are accepted with prob-
ability , then it is possible to extract a witness ! such that (; !) 2 R with
probability  , given oracle access to the prover.
 Zero-Knowledge: if the prover knows ! such that (; !) 2 R, then even a
malicious verier V 0 obtains no new information on ! from the execution of
the protocol. This means that for any such malicious verier, there exists a
Simulator algorithm S such that:
S()  Outputs[P (; !)$ V 0()]:
The description of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the rst two examples
can be seen below:
 A Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Protocol for Graph Isomor-
phism
LG0 are the graphs isomorphic to G0. A graph G1 2 LG0 if and only if there
exists an isomorphism  such that (G1) = G0. Therefore, R = f(G1; ) :
G1 2 LG0 ; (G1) = G0g. Suppose the prover knows  such that (G1) = G0.
(1) The prover chooses isomorphism  at random and sends H = (G0) to
V .
(2) The verier chooses random bit b 2 f0; 1g and sends b to the prover.
(3) If b = 0, P replies  = . If b = 1, the prover replies  =   .
(4) The verier outputs 1 if and only if  (Gb) = H.
If this process is repeated n times in parallel, the cheating probability of a
dishonest prover is 2 n. This process fulls the subsequent properties:
 Completeness: trivial.
 Proof of Knowledge: extractor runs the prover until step 3, with
b = 0, and obtains  0. Then rewinds back to step 2, chooses b = 1 and
lets the prover output  1. The extracted witness  =  
 1
0   1 satises
(G1) = G0.
 Zero-Knowledge: a transcript (H; b;  ) of the protocol between the
prover and a malicious verier can be simulated by S as follows:
(1) choose a random permutation  ,
(2) choose bit b 2 f0; 1g with the same distribution as the malicious
verier does,
(3) compute H =  (Gb).
 A Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Protocol for Discrete Loga-
rithm
L(G;~g) are the elements in the cyclic group G = h~gi. A witness for y 2 G is
x 2 Z such that ~gx = y. Therefore, R = f(y; x) : y 2 G; ~gx = yg. G has
public prime order ~p. Suppose the prover knows x 2 Z~p such that ~gx = y.
(1) The prover chooses r 2R Z~p at random and sends R = ~gr to the verier.
(2) The verier chooses h 2R Z~p at random and sends h to the prover.
(3) The prover computes s = r + x  hmod ~p and sends s to the verier.
(4) The verier outputs 1 if and only if ~gs = R  yh.
The previous protocol satises this properties:
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 Completeness: trivial.
 Proof of Knowledge: the extractor runs the prover until step 3, with
random h, and obtains s. Then rewinds back to step 2, chooses a dif-
ferent h0 6= h and lets the prover output s0. The extracted witness
x = s s
0
h h0 mod p satises ~g
x = y.
 Zero-Knowledge: a transcript (R; h; s) of the protocol between the
prover and a malicious verier can be simulated by S as follows:
(1) choose at random s 2 Z~p,
(2) choose h 2 Z~p with the same distribution as the malicious verier
does,
(3) compute R = ~gs  y h.
2. From Interactive 3-Round Proofs to Non-Interactive
Proofs
In the previous section, two examples of interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge with 3 rounds of communication: commitment, challenge, nal answer were
explained. It can be noted that the only task of V was to choose a random chal-
lenge.
If the prover P chooses this random challenge by himself, then the verier V does
not participate, and the protocol becomes non-interactive. This new type of proof
will be known as a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof of knowledge.
But in order to prevent success from a dishonest prover P , the random challenge
must be linked to the commitment. For instance, challenge= H(commitment),
where H is a good hash function that behaves as a random oracle, heuristically.
Besides, more inputs can be added to H, for example, a message can be signed.
2.1. Application to Discrete Logarithm Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowl-
edge: Schnorr Signatures. Given H, which is a hash function, and a commit-
ment c = ~gr, the value h = H(c; ) is a challenge, and s = r + x  hmod ~p is the
nal answer, the resulting signature scheme can be called  and was introduced by
Schnorr [25]. The description of the signature scheme can be seen hereunder:
 Key generation, (sk; pk)  :KG(1k) : The group G = h~gi has prime
order ~p, with k bits. x 2R Z~p is taken and y = ~gx computed. A good hash
function is chosen H : f0; 1g ! Z~p.
The resulting public key is pk = (G; ~g; y;H), and the secret key is sk = x.
 Signature,   :Sign(m; sk) : in order to sign a message m 2 f0; 1g the
following steps need to be fullled.
(1) r 2R Z~p is chosen at random and c = ~gr is computed,
(2) h = H(m; c) is computed,
(3) nally s = r + x  hmod ~p is computed and the signature is dened as
 = (c; s).
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 Verication, 1 or 0 :Vfy(m;; pk) : given a tuple (m; c; s) of a message
or a signature, the value 1 is returned if and only if
~gs = c  yH(m;c):
The proof of the Schnorr signature scheme in proved in the random oracle model,
and is proved by reduction to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. The
key point of the proof is the forking lemma; once A forges a signature  = (c; s) on
m, such that h = H(m; c), if the attacker A is replied with the same randomness
until (m; c) is queried to the random oracle, then the answer h0 6= h is provided.
With some probability, the second execution gives another valid signature 0 =
(c; s0) on m and from the two forgeries, it is easy to extract the discrete logarithm
of y.
Chapter 4
Attribute-Based Signatures from RSA
In this chapter, the concept and protocols of attribute-based signatures will be
introduced. Furthermore, a complete description of the attribute-based signature
from RSA developed by Herranz in [18], in which revocation of users is being
incorporated, is done in this chapter.
1. Attribute-Based Signatures
This rst section focuses on describing the concept and protocols of attribute-based
signatures. These specic protocols were developed in [18] over the protocols of [?]
in order to deal explicitly with the identity of users. An attribute-based signature
is conjoint to a determined signing policy (P; ): a set P of attributes and a
monotone increasing family    2P of subsets of P. A valid signature entails that
a signer possessing all the attributes of some of the subsets in   is the author of the
signature. The monotonicity property secures that S1  S2; S1 2   ) S2 2  . A
simple example of such a monotone increasing family of subsets is the threshold case.
Given a (`; n)-threshold signing policy, with a set P which contains n attributes,
and   = fS  P : jSj  `g, a verier authenticates a threshold attribute-based
signature if he is assured that the author of the signature holds at least ` of the
attributes included in the set P.
1.1. Syntactic Denition.
An attribute-based signature scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms:
 Setup(1). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter  and
outputs the initial public parameters pms and the master secret key msk for
the master entity. Within the public parameters appear the possible universe
of attributes ~P = fat1; : : : ; atng.
 KeyGen(id; S;msk; pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the mas-
ter secret key msk, the public parameters pms, furthermore, an identity id that
satises a set of attributes S  ~P is required. The output is a private key
skid;S .
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 Sign(m;P; ; skid;S ; pms). The signing algorithm takes as input a message m,
a signing policy (P; ) where P  ~P and    2P , a secret key skid;S and the
public parameters pms, and outputs a signature .
 Verify(;m;P; ; pms). The verication algorithm takes as input the signature
, the message m, the signing policy (P; ) and the public parameters pms.
The outputs are 1 if the signature is accepted or 0 if it is rejected. signature.
Such a scheme fulls the correctness' property, if for a signature  with respect
to a signing policy (P; ) that is calculated by using skid;S such that S 2  , the
signature  is always accepted as valid by the verication protocol.
1.2. Security Denitions.
Privacy. The privacy property entails that given a valid signature, nobody can
obtain any information about the real author of the signature. That is to say,
given two pairs (id0; S0) and (id1; S1), with S0; S1  P, and a valid signature
  Sign(m;P; ; skidb;Sb ; pms) for a signing policy   such that S0; S1 2  , nobody
would be able to guess the bit b with probability signicantly bigger than 1=2. The
privacy property is formally dened via the following experiments Expprivb;B (), for
b = 0; 1, involving an adversary B.
Exp
priv
b;B ()
(pms;msk) Setup(1)
(m;P; ; id0; S0; skid0;S0 ; id1; S1; skid1;S1 ; st1) B(pms;msk)
Verify that skidi;Si is a valid secret key for Si, for i = 0; 1
Verify that S0 \ P 2   and S1 \ P 2  
  Sign(m;P; ; skidb;Sb ; pms)
b0  B(; pms;msk; st1)
Output b0
The advantage of B in breaking the privacy property is dened as
Adv
priv
B () =
Pr[Exppriv0;B() = 1]  Pr[Exppriv1;B() = 1] :
Definition 4. An attribute-based signature scheme is private if, for any adver-
sary B that runs in polynomial time, the advantage AdvprivB () is negligible in the
security parameter .
Seeing that the adversary B can obtain the master secret key, other properties
are implied by the privacy property, such as anonymity and unlinkability. The
anonymity property means that given a valid signature, identifying the actual
signer is computationally hard and the unlinkability property implies that deciding
whether two dierent valid signatures were computed by the same user is compu-
tationally hard.
Unforgeability. An attribute-based signature scheme must full the property of ex-
istential unforgeability against chosen message and signing policy attacks. Such
2. EXISTING ATTRIBUTE-BASED SCHEME FOR A THRESHOLD SIGNING POLICY 17
property is dened by the following experiment ExpunfF () involving an adversary
F .
ExpunfF ()
(pms;msk) Setup(1)
(;m;P; ) FKeyGen(;msk;pms); Sign(;pms)(pms)
Output 1 if the three following statements are true:
(i) Verify(;m;P; ; pms) returns 1;
(ii) F has not made any secret key query (id; S) such that S \ P 2  ;
(iii) (m;P; ; ) is not the result of any signature query from F .
Otherwise, output 0
The advantage of F in breaking the unforgeability of the scheme is dened as
AdvunfF () = Pr[Exp
unf
F () = 1]. We stress that F is allowed to make adaptive
queries for secret keys of pairs (id; S) of his choice, and adaptive signing queries
for tuples (m;P; ) of his choice, where    2P . The last kind of queries are
answered by choosing a random subset S  P with S 2  , and then by running
skid;S  KeyGen(id; S;msk; pms) and   Sign(m;P; ; skid;S ; pms).
Definition 5. An attribute-based signature scheme is unforgeable if, for any
adversary F that runs in polynomial time, the advantage AdvunfF () is negligible in
the security parameter .
As well as in the privacy denition, the unforgeability denition implies the collusion
resistance property. A group of colluding users (even if it is comprised of all the
users) that pool together their secret keys, will not be able to sign messages for a
signing policy that none of the attribute sets of these users satises.
2. Existing Attribute-Based Scheme for a Threshold
Signing Policy
In this section, it will be explained the main aspects of this signature scheme that
will be used in Chapter 7 once the revocation method is implemented. The security
of this scheme (privacy and unforgeability of the signatures) is established under
the Strong RSA Assumption and the Decisional Die-Hellman Assumption inQRN
with known factorisation (Assumptions 1 and 2 in Chapter 2).
The original attribute-based signature scheme was developed in [18]. For simplicity
of explanation, the signature scheme is developed in the case of threshold signing
policies, a pair (P; ) will be depicted as (P; `), where 1  `  jPj. The four
existing algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), are described hereunder.
Setup(1). The setup algorithm begins by running (P;Q;N; g)  RSA.Inst(1),
where N = PQ, P = 2p+1 and Q = 2q+1. Choose security parameters ; 1; 2 2
N and  2 R,  > 1, such that 1   2 > (2 + ) > . We denote as  the set of
integers in the interval [21   22 + 1; 21 + 22   1].
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A prime number q0 in the interval [2 1; 2] is chosen. Two cryptographic hash
functions H0 : f0; 1g ! QR(N) and H1 : f0; 1g ! Zq0 are also chosen. Finally,
the global set of attributes ~P has to be chosen.
The public parameters are pms = (; 1; 2; ;; ;N; g;H0;H1; q
0; ~P), whereas the
master secret key is msk = (P;Q).
KeyGen(id; S;msk; pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input an identity
id, a subset of attributes S  ~P satised by id, the master secret key msk and
the public parameters pms. The master entity chooses at random a prime number
e R  such that gcd(e; pq) = 1 and, for each ati 2 S, computes the value ski =
H0(ati)
1=emodN (using the knowledge of the prime numbers P;Q). The global
secret key is skid;S = (e; fskigati2S).
Sign(m;P; `; skid;S ; pms). The signing algorithm takes as input a message m, a set
of attributes P  ~P, a threshold `, a secret key skid;S = (e; fskigati2S) and the
public parameters pms. The algorithm selects a minimally authorised set S0, this
is, a subset of S \ P of cardinality exactly `. Without loss of generality, let us
assume P = fat1; : : : ; atng and S0 = fat1; : : : ; at`g. To generate the signature, it
proceeds as follows:
(1) Choose h R QR(N) and r R ZN . ComputeA = grmodN , B = gehrmodN .
(2) For j = `+ 1; : : : ; n, choose cj
R Zq0 , Cj ; Zj R QR(N), uj R f0; 1g(2+),
vj
R f0; 1g(+), wj R f0; 1g(1+++1), and compute the values Dj =
Auj cj2
1
gwj
modN , Ej =
gvj
Acj
modN , Fj = g
uj cj21  hvj  Bcj modN and
Gj =
C
uj cj21
j H0(atj)cj
Z
wj
j
modN .
(3) For i = 1; : : : ; `, choose Zi
R QR(N), i R f0; 1g(2+), i R f0; 1g(2+),
i
R f0; 1g(1+2++1), and compute the values Ci = ski  Zri modN ,
Di =
Ai
gi
modN , Ei = g
i modN , Fi = g
i hi modN and Gi = C
i
i
Z
i
i
modN .
(4) Compute the hash value c = H1 (m;P; `; h; A;B; fCi; Di; Ei; Fi; Gi; Zigati2P).
(5) Find the (only) polynomial f(x) 2 Zq0 [X] with degree at most n  ` such that
f(0) = cmod q0 and f(j) = cj mod q0 for all j = `+ 1; : : : ; n.
(6) For i = 1; : : : ; `, compute ci = f(i)mod q
0 and then compute the values ui =
i   ci  (e  21), vi = i   ci  r and wi = i   ci  e  r, over the integers.
The resulting signature is  = (f(x); h; A;B; f(Ci; ui; vi; wi; Zi)gati2P).
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Verify(;m;P; `; pms). The verication algorithm takes as input a message m, the
signature  of m, the threshold signing policy (P; `), with n = jPj, and the public
parameters pms. It proceeds as follows:
(1) Verify that the degree of f(x) is at most n   `. For all ati 2 P, verify that
ui 2 f0; 1g(2+), vi 2 f0; 1g(+) and wi 2 f0; 1g(1+++1). Return
0 if this is not the case.
(2) For all ati 2 P, compute ci = f(i) and then compute the values Di =
Aui ci2
1
gwi modN , Ei =
gvi
Aci modN , Fi = g
ui ci21  hvi  Bci modN and
Gi =
C
ui ci21
i H0(ati)ci
Z
wi
i
modN .
(3) Return 1 if f(0) = H1 (m;P; `; h;A;B; fCi; Di; Ei; Fi; Gi; Zigati2P), and re-
turn 0 otherwise.
This signature scheme is obtained through the transformation explained in section
2 of the previous Chapter, that is, the signature is a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of an integer e and at least ` e th roots modulo N of the values
H0(ati), for i = 1; : : : ; n.

Chapter 5
Non-membership based on Polynomial
Evaluation Argument
The rst model studied to implement revocation into the RSA attribute-based sig-
nature, was developed by Bayer and Groth in [4]. The revocation method is based
on a polynomial evaluation argument, this construction is a public-coin 3-move
special honest verier zero-knowledge argument which only relies on the discrete
logarithm assumption and has logarithmic communication cost in the size D of the
revocation list.
This model was chosen because it is an improvement from previous methods with
communication complexity to O(
p
D) elements such as the ones developed by
Brands, Demuynck and De Decker [5] and Peng [24]. Another reason for selecting
this method instead of accumulators such as the one proposed by Li, Li and Xue in
[19], which was previously studied in [15], is that accumulators rely on a trusted
third party to maintain the accumulator, which could cause problems if this party
was corrupted.
Moreover, in contrast to accumulator protocols such as [19] that work in groups
of hidden order, where operations must be done in Z and the resulting elements
are too big, Bayer and Groth protocol is implemented in groups with public prime
order, hence the elements of the proofs although are bounded values, even though
there can be more elements than in an accumulator protocol.
A complete description of the polynomial evaluation argument is exposed in the
next section.
1. Polynomial evaluation argument
Bayer and Groth polynomial evaluation argument is explained for polynomials in
Z~p[X], where ~p is a public prime, but the attribute-based RSA signature is devel-
oped in QRN , which has order pq that is not public. Hence, a new execution of the
RSA.Inst(1) algorithm is needed, the commitment key is ck = (G; ~p; ~g; ~h), where
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G is a cyclic group of k-bit prime order ~p and random generators ~g; ~h.
Given a degree D polynomial P (U) =
PD
i=0 aiU
i and two Pedersen commitments
c0; cv to values u and v in the group G, an argument of knowledge for the values u
and v that satisfy P (u) = v will be described. It must be noted that the notation
for c0 for the commitment to u = u
20 is in accordance with the other commitments
cj to u
2j .
D is dened as D = 2d+1   1, also it is convenient to write i in binary i = id    i0
where ij 2 f0; 1g. The term U i in the polynomial can be rewritten as U i =
U
Pd
j=0 ij2
j
=
Qd
j=0(U
2j )ij . The polynomial obtained replacing this term is
P (U) =
DX
i=0
aiU
i =
1X
i0; ;id=0
aidi0
dY
j=0
(U2
j
)ij
The commitments c1;    ; cd of the values u21 ;    ; u2d are inserted into the rewrit-
ten polynomial and the relation P (u) = v becomes
P1
i0; ;id aidi0
Qd
j=0(u
2j )ij = v.
The prover only makes a logarithmic number of commitments seeing that d =
blogDc which will be helpful in order to achieve eciency.
A new polynomial is dened to show the committed powers of u in c0;    ; cd eval-
uate to the committed v, so the prover chooses random values f0;    ; fd and the
following polynomial is obtained.
Q(X) =
1X
i0; ;id=0
aidi0
dY
j=0
(Xu2
j
+fj)
ijX1 ij = Xd+1P (U)+Xdd+  +X1+0
The choice of Q(x) is based on that for each ij either an Xu
2j factor is included or
an X factor is included so the coecient of Xd+1 is P (u). The contrary happens
with fj , each fj is not multiplied by X, hence it will only aect the lower degree
coecients 0;    ; d of Q(x).
Afterwards the prover will demonstrate that the coecient of Xd+1 in the secret
Q(X) is the same as v in a sense that cancels out the 0;    ; d coecients. The
prover forwards the commitments cf0 ;    ; cfd , f0;    ; fd, c0 ;    ; cd , 0;    ; d
to the verier. Subsequently the verier will choose a random challenge x  Z~p.
The prover will open the corresponding products of the commitments so as to
the verier will be able to check that the committed values u; v satisfy Q(X) =
xd+1v+ xdd +   + 0. Literally, after receiving the challenge x, the prover opens
the products cxj cfj to
fj = xu
2j + fj . Moreover the prover opens c
xd+1
v
Qd
j=0 c
xj
j
to
 =
P1
i0; ;id=0 aidi0
Qd
j=0
f
ij
j x
1 ij . The verier will only accept if the opening
satises
1X
=i0; ;id=0
aidi0
dY
j=0
f
ij
j x
1 ij = xd+1v + xdd +   + x1 + 0
The previous identity has negligible probability of being true unless P (u) = v.
1. POLYNOMIAL EVALUATION ARGUMENT 23
The prover will also need to show that c1;    ; cd include the correct powers of u,
u2
1
;    ; u2d . The prover sends commitments cfuj to fju2
j
to the verier and later
opens the commitments cxuj+1c
  fj
uj cfuj to
xu2
j+1   (xu2j + fj)u2j + fju2j = 0
1.1. Polynomial evaluation argument description. The complete polynomial
argument is mentioned below.
Common reference string: ck = (G; ~p; ~g; ~h) RSA.Inst(1)
Statement: P (U) =
PD
i=0 aiU
i =
P1
i0; ;id aidi0
Qd
j=0(U
2j )ij 2 Z~p[U ] and
c0; cv 2 G
Prover's witness:PKf(u; v; r0; t) : c0 = ~gu~hr0 ^ cv = ~gv~ht ^ P (u) = vg
Initial message: Compute
(1) c1 = ~g
u2
1
~hr1 ;    ; cd = ~g2d~hrd where r1;    ; rd  Z~p
(2) cf0 = ~g
f0~hs0 ;    ; cfd = ~gfd~hsd where f0; s0;    ; fd; sd  Z~p
(3) 0;    ; d 2 Z~p such that
1X
i0; ;id=0
aidi0
dY
j=0
(Xu2
j
+ fj)
ijX1 ij = Xd+1v +
dX
i=0
Xjj
(4) c0 = ~g
0~ht0 ;    ; cd = ~gd~htd where t0;    ; td  Z~p
(5) cfu0 = ~g
f0u
20 ~h0 ;    ; cfud 1 = ~gfd 1u
2d 1 ~hd 1 where 0;    ; d 1  Z~p
Challenge: x Z~p
Answer: Compute for all j
fj = xu
2j+fj rj = xrj+sj t = x
d+1t+
dX
i=0
tix
i j = xrj+1  fjrj+j
Send: f0; r0;    ; fd; rd; t; 0;    ; d 1
Verication: Accept if and only if for all j
cxj cfj = ~g
fj~hrj cxj+1c
  fj
j cfuj =
~h
j
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and
cx
d+1
v
dY
i=0
cx
i
i = ~g
P1
i0; ;id=0 aidi0
Qd
j=0
f
ij
j x
1 ij ~h
t
This polynomial evaluation argument satises the properties of a zero-knowledge
proof. The complete proof can be found in [4]. This proof uses a similar denition
to zero-knowledge proof called argument of knowledge that was rst explained by
Groth and Ishai [17], which uses the term witness-extended emulation described
by Lindell [20].
Bayer and Groth [4] employ the term special honest verier zero-knowledge SHV ZK,
which is not full zero-knowledge and in real life applications, sometimes special
honest verier zero-knowledge may not suce since a malicious verier could give
non-random challenges. Nonetheless, it is always possible to convert an argument
into a full zero-knowledge argument secure against arbitrary veriers. This conver-
sion only costs a small overhead.
1.2. Eciency. An estimation of the communication cost for the polynomial eval-
uation argument was made which will be used later to assess the eciency of the
revocation method. The communication size for a degree D = 2d+1 polynomial is
approximately 4d elements from G and 3d elements from Z~p elements.
The prover employs 8d exponentiations in order to compute the commitments. The
values 0;    ; d that satisfy
1X
i0; ;id=0
aidi0
dY
j=0
(Xu2
j
+ fj)
ijX1 ij = Xd+1v +Xdd +   +X1 + 0
also need to be calculated.
The D polynomials
Qd
j=0(Xu
2j + fj)
ijX1 ij with degree d+ 1, can be calculated
using a binary-tree algorithm for all choices of i0;    ; id 2 f0; 1g with a cost of dD
multiplications in Z~p. Multiplying with the aidi0 are another dD multiplications.
The total cost for the prover is 8d exponentiations in G and 2dD multiplications in
Z~p.
The verier checks the argument using 6d exponentiations in G because the ex-
ponent x is twice employed in the verication equations. In addition, this sumP1
i0; ;id=0 aidi0
Qd
j=0
f
ij
j x
1 ij for all choices i0;    ; id 2 f0; 1g must be calcu-
lated using 2D multiplications in Z~p.
2. Non-membership Argument
Finally, a non-membership argument is constructed using the polynomial argument
in the previous section.
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Given a public revocation list L = fe1;    ; eDg, where the values are chosen from
 the set of integers in the interval [21   22 + 1; 21 + 22   1] from the RSA
attribute-based signature scheme of Chapter 4, the purpose is to demonstrate that
the committed value u =2 L. This value u corresponds to the prime number e given
in the secret key of a user of the RSA attribute-based signature scheme. It must
be noted that a commitment B = ge hrmodN to e is part of each attribute-based
signature.
The following public polynomial is dened P (X) =
QD
i=1(X   ei) with the revoked
elements set as roots. This polynomial is dened in Z~p[X], where ~p is a prime num-
ber bigger than 21 + 22 + 1 and a group G of order ~p is chosen with generators
~g; ~h.
Given this polynomial, u 2 L if and only if P (u) = 0. The prover has the commit-
ment cu = ~g
u~hr 2 G and needs to demonstrate that the value u is not in L showing
that P (u) 6= 0.
In rst place, since the RSA attribute-based signature scheme and the polyno-
mial evaluation argument are developed in dierent groups, it is necessary that the
prover proves to the verier that the value committed in B in the ABS,in bases
(g; h) is the same as the value committed in cu in bases (~g; ~h): In second place,
the prover computes v = P (u) and calculates the commitment cv = ~g
v~ht. Using
the polynomial evaluation argument described in the previous section, the prover
can prove that the commitment cv contains v = P (u). Afterwards to prove non-
membership the prover only needs to prove that v 6= 0. The majority of the cost of
the revocation method lies in the polynomial evaluation argument.
A description of the non-membership steps is hereunder:
Common reference string: A key generation algorithm chooses a group G of
order ~p and random generators ~g; ~h. The commitment key is ck = (G; ~p; ~g; ~h)
Statement: L = fe1;    ; eDg; P (X) =
QD
i=1(X   ei) 2 Z[~p] and cu 2 G
Prover's witness:
Step 1: PKf(u; s; r) : B = guhs ^ cu = ~gu~hrg
Step 2: PKf(u; r) : cu = ~gu~hr ^ u =2 Lg
Argument: Step 1: The prover proves to the verier that the value committed in
B in bases (g; h) is the same as the value committed in cu in bases (~g; ~h):
PKf(u; s; r) : B = guhs ^ cu = ~gu~hrg
(1) The prover chooses y 2 [0; 2(1+2+)], 1; 2 2 [0; 2(2+)] at random and
sends Y1 = g
yh1 and Y2 = ~g
y~h2 to the verier.
(2) The verier chooses random z 2 [0; 2] and sends it to the prover.
(3) The prover sends x = y + zu, w1 = 1 + zs and w2 = 2 + zr.
(4) The verier checks that gxhw1 = Y1(B)
z and ~gx~hw2 = Y2(cu)
z.
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Step 2: Pick t1; t2  Z~p, v = P (u), w = v 1 are computed, the commitments
cv = ~g
v~ht1 , cw = ~g
w~ht2 are calculated. The prover proves to the verier that v 6= 0.
PKf(v; w; t1; t2) : cv = ~gv~ht1 ^ cw = ~gw~ht2g
(1) The prover chooses ;  2 [0; 2(1+2+)], 1; 2 2 [0; 2(2+)] and 3 2
[0; 2(1+2+2+)] at random and sends Y1 = ~g
~h1 , Y2 = ~g
~h2 and Y3 =
(cw)
~h3 to the verier.
(2) The verier chooses random z 2 [0; 2] and sends it to the prover.
(3) The prover sends  1 = + zv,  2 =  + zw 1 = 1 + zt1 and 2 = 2 + zt2,
3 = 3   zt2 and sends  1;  2; 1; 2; 3 to the verier.
(4) The verier checks that ~g 1~h1 = Y1(cv)
z, ~g 2~h2 = Y2(cw)
z and (cw)
 1~h3 =
Y3g
z.
Step 3: The prover will need to prove in zero-knowledge that P (u) = v using the
polynomial evaluation argument previously described.
Verication: The verier accepts u =2 L if and only if the value committed in B
in the ABS in bases (g; h) is the same as the value committed in cu in bases (~g; ~h)
and the commitment cv 2 G and the zero-knowledge arguments are valid.
The rst step is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of equality of representation
in dierent bases. Completeness of this step is clear, and the zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge can be seen below. It will be shown that even a malicious verier V 0,
would not obtain new information on u from the execution of the protocol.
PKf(u; s; r) : B = guhs ^ cu = ~gu~hrg
A transcript (Y1; Y2; z; x; w1; w2) of the protocol between the prover and V
0 can be
simulated as follows:
(1) Choose at random x 2 [0; 2(1+2+)], w1; w2 2 [0; 2(2+)]
(2) Choose at random z 2 [0; 2] with the same distribution as V 0 does and,
(3) compute Y1 = g
xhw1 B z and Y2 = ~gx~hw2  (cu) z
In order to show soundness of this step, a similar proof can be found in the following
Chapter 6 and also there are more related proofs in [14] and [15].
The second and third steps above is a zero-knowledge proof of an opening of cu to
u =2 L. The protocol consists of two dierent zero-knowledge proofs. The third step
stems from the polynomial evaluation argument and the second step is a classical
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms in a group G with prime
and public order ~p which can be proved in a similar way as step 1. The combination
of the two proofs is clear and the completeness of the protocol remains.
Finally, the zero-knowledge proofs from the two steps will prove that the protocol
gets openings u; v of the commitments satisfying v 6= 0 and P (u) = v, and that the
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value u from cu is the same one from B in the ABS. This means that u is not a
root of the polynomial P (X) =
QD
i=1(X   ei) and thus u =2 L.

Chapter 6
Peng and Bao non-membership proof
for special applications
Subsequent to adding the revocation protocol based on the polynomial evaluation
argument in Chapter 5 into the RSA attribute-based signature scheme of Chap-
ter 4, the result was compared with a previous method incorporated in [15]. The
method previously employed was originally described by Li,Li, Xue [19] and was
based on accumulators.
One of the main dierences between [19] and [4] is that in the case of [19] the
revoked list L = fe1;    ; eng is private, but in the case of Bayer and Groth [4] the
revoked list is made public. Bayer and Groth did not considered that maintaining
the revocation list private is essential, so the revoked users will lose their anonymity,
and instead the necessity of a trusted third party on-line is removed, as there is
no need of an entity that maintains the accumulator in a private way and issues
non-membership witnesses for non-revoked users on top of updating privately the
witnesses every time a new user is revoked.
Taking into consideration the previous remarks, the idea of employing an accumu-
lator was recovered, additionally a new protocol described by Peng and Bao [23]
was found, which seemed more ecient than the Li, Li, Xue [19] protocol used in
[15] in the case where the revoked elements are loosely coprime (a property that
will be dened later), which occurs in the attribute-based signature considered in
this work [18], because the elements ei of each signature are prime numbers.
After making the adaptation of the protocol described by Peng and Bao, we tried to
prove in detail that the protocol satised the required soundness and zero-knowledge
properties. Regarding the soundness property, we were not able to succeed. This is
a common situation in cryptographic research, when one tries to prove some secu-
rity property of a specic protocol: if one does not succeed, it may happen that the
security proof exists but is very tricky, or it may happen that the protocol is not
secure, and so there is no security proof. In this particular case of the protocol in
[23], we were actually able to nd an explicit attack against the soundness property.
After that, we modied their protocol in order to achieve soundness, as we will see
in the next chapter.
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In this Chapter, we rst describe the protocol by the Peng and Bao [23] and then
we explain the specic attack that we found, against the protocol.
1. Formulation of the protocol
In this protocol, there is a public list of integer values, L = fs1; s2; : : : ; sng, and a
prover has committed an integer element m into a commitment cm. This prover
wants to prove, in zero-knowledge, that the committed value m is not in the list
L. The protocol of Peng and Bao (in Section 3 of [23]) works in the special case
where m is loosely coprime with the elements in L; that is, gcd(m;Qni=1 si) <
min(js1j; js2j; : : : ; jsnj).
The steps of the protocol are described below:
Step 1: The commitment algorithm corresponds to the one developed by Fujisaki-
Okamoto [16]. The message m is committed in c = gmhrmodN where r is ran-
domly chosen from ZN .
Step 2: The prover calculates C = gs1s2sn modN .
Step 3: The prover uses the Euclidean algorithm and the Euclidean algorithm from
chapter 2 to calculate integers k and l in Z that satisfy
km+ l
nY
i=1
si = j
where j = gcd(m;
Qn
i=1 si).
Step 4: The prover proves the knowledge of secret integers k; l; j; R such that
ckmC
l = ghRmodN
j < s
as follows where R = kr and s = min(js1j; js2j; : : : ; jsnj).
(1) The prover publishes f = gjhr
0
modN where r0 is randomly chosen from ZN .
(2) The prover proves that the integer committed in f is in f1; 2;    ; s 1g using
the range proof in [7].
(3) The prover proves that he knows secret integers k; l; j; R; r0 such that
ckmC
l = ghRmodN
f = gjhr
0
modN
Trough the following protocol:
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(3.1) The prover randomly chooses integers u; v and w0 in Z. The following
equations are computed:
y = um+ v
nY
i=1
si
w = ur
a = gyhw
0
modN
where   k ,   l ,   j ,   R ,   r0 where  is a security
parameter, and a is send to the verier.
(3.2) A random challenge z in Z is generated by the verier.
(3.3) The prover publishes
b1 = u  zk 2 Z
b2 = v   zl 2 Z
b3 = y   zj 2 Z
b4 = w   zR 2 Z
b5 = w
0   zr0 2 Z
(3.4) The verier checks
cb1Cb2 = gb3hb4 modN
gb3hb5fz = amodN
The proof is accepted if the verication of the range proof (2) and the veri-
cation equations in (3.4) are satised.
2. Description of an attack
A dishonest prover that has been revoked, for example if his number is s1 = 3, and
his message m is equal to 3, committed in the value cm = g
3  hr. This revoked
user would be able fool the verier with a probability of 1=3, through the following
procedure.
Such a revokd user may dene j = 1, k = 1=3 (a rational number!), l = 0, and
then follow all the steps of the protocol, and trust that the challenge z would be a
multiple of 3, which happens with a probability of 1=3 in the interactive case, as
the challenge is chosen z is a random integer chosen by the verier.
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The case of non-interactive signatures is even worse, because the dishonest prover
can pick random values until the output of the hash function z = H(   ) is a
multiple of 3.
In such a case, the dishonest prover is able to calculate the value b1 = u zk, which
is an integer value. The same happens with the rest of values b2; b3; b4; b5 (note
that R = kr may be rational, as it happens with k, but b4 will be an integer with
probability 1=3). Summing up, with probability 1=3 the two verication equations
are satised and the dishonest prover convinces the verier, which results in a clear
attack against the soundness property of the protocol.
Chapter 7
New proposal of non-membership proof
After nding that the Peng and Bao [23] revocation protocol was not sound, a
number of modications and additions were made in order to create a revocation
protocol designed specially for the Attribute-Based Signature of [18], because in
this case the elements of the revoked list L = fe1;    ; eng are prime numbers as
the correspond with the element ei of each signature.
As stated in the previous chapter, after incorporating the revocation protocol based
on the polynomial evaluation argument in Chapter 5 into the RSA attribute-based
signature scheme it was compared with the previous method incorporated in [15].
Since the other method was based on accumulators, the master entity or a trusted
third party was needed to maintain the accumulator in a private way and issue
non-membership witnesses for non-revoked users. Every time a user was revoked
the master entity would have need to update the accumulator, and each user of the
system would need to update his non-membership witness. Though the cost of the
accumulator protocol is xed as it does not depend on the number of revoked users
in contrast to the polynomial evaluation protocol, the total cost of communication
is higher in the case of the accumulator (unless the revocation list grows consider-
ably).
However the main disadvantages of accumulator protocols that Bayer and Groth
listed in [4], such as accumulators are dynamic, a trusted third party is needed and
the constant update between master entity and users, do not apply to our particu-
lar attribute-based signature scheme, as the security of the signature would enable
to make public the revoked list L = fe1;    ; eng. Hence a trusted third party
would not be needed anymore as the accumulated value C = ge1e2en modN can
be calculated by the user, thus simplifying the revocation method: the non-revoked
users can compute their witnesses for the list L, without any dynamic interaction
with the master entity, whose only task will be the update of L.
In this Chapter a new revocation protocol will be proposed, based on the idea of
accumulators but making the revocation list L = fe1;    ; eng public as we consid-
ered as Bayer and Groth did in [4] that is not essential to maintain this list private,
thus simplifying and reducing the cost of the protocol. The basics of the protocol
are derived from Peng and Bao [23], but a number of modications will be made
to ensure soundness.
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Finally in Chapter 8 a comparison between Bayer-Groth protocol and this new solu-
tion will be made in the case of revoking user in the RSA attribute-based signature
of Chapter 4.
Step 1: The commitment algorithm corresponds to the one developed by Fujisaki-
Okamoto [16]. The value u is committed in cu = g
uhrmodN where r is randomly
chosen from ZN . This value u corresponds to the prime number e given in the
secret key of a user of the RSA attribute-based signature scheme. It must be noted
that the commitment cu is actually equal to B = g
e  hrmodN , which is already
part of each attribute-based signature.
Step 2: The prover calculates C = ge1e2en modN .
Step 3: The prover uses the Euclidean algorithm and the Bezout's identity from
chapter 2 to calculate integers k and l in Z that satisfy
ku+ l
nY
i=1
ei = 1
In our particular attribute based signature scheme the revoked values L = fe1;    ; eng
are prime numbers, hence the value u will satisfy the Bezout's identity, in any other
case u will correspond to a revoked value.
Step 4: The prover proves the knowledge of secret integers k; l; R such that
(1) ckuC
l = ghRmodN
where R = kr.
A protocol for such a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge can be found below:
Step 4: The prover proves to the verier that he knows secret integers k; l; R such
that
g = ckuC
lh RmodN
(1) In order to achieve soundness the following values rk; rl; rR are added and
the equations Bk = g
khrk , Ak = g
rk , Bl = g
lhrl , Al = g
rl , BR = g
RhrR ,
AR = g
rR must be dened. Then the prover chooses ;  2 [0; 2(1+2+)],
 2 [0; 2(1+2+2+)], k; l; R 2 [0; 2(2+)] at random and computes Y =
cuC
h , Ek = gk , Fk = ghk , El = gl , Fl = ghl , ER = gR and
FR = g
hR . Finally the prover send to the verier:
(Ak; Bk; Al; Rl; AR; BR; Y; Ek; Fk; El; Fl; ER; FR)
(2) The verier chooses random s 2 [0; 2] and sends it to the prover.
(3) The prover sends x = +sk, y = +sl, z = +sR, vk = k+srk, vl = l+srl
and vR = R + srR.
(4) The verier checks that:
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(a) cxuC
yh z = Y  gs
(b) gvk = Ek  (Ak)s
(c) gx  hvk = Fk  (Bk)s
(d) gvl = El  (Al)s
(e) gy  hvl = Fl  (Bl)s
(f) gvR = ER  (AR)s
(g) gz  hvR = FR  (BR)s
Theorem 4. The previous protocol is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of
integer values (k; l; r) such that g = ckClh RmodN and thus is a non-membership
proof of the value u.
The security properties of the non-membership proof derived from the zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge are proved below
Proof. Completeness of the non-membership proof is straightforward.
In order to prove the zero-knowledge of the protocol, it will be shown that even a
malicious verier V 0, would not obtain new information on u from the execution of
the protocol.
PKf(k; l; R) : g = ckuClh RmodNg
A transcript (Y;Ak; Bk; Al; Bl; AR; BR; Ek; Fk; El; Fl; Es; x; y; z; vk; vl; vR) of the pro-
tocol between the prover and V 0 can be simulated as follows:
(1) Choose at random x; y 2 [0; 2(12+)], z 2 [0; 2(1+2+2+)], vk; vl; vR 2
[0; 2(2+)], and Ak; Bk; Al; Bl; AR; BR 2 QRN .
(2) Choose at random s 2 [0; 2] with the same distribution as V 0 does and,
(3) compute Y = cxuC
yh z  g s, Ek = gvk  (Ak) s, Fk = gx  hvk  (Bk) s,
El = g
vl (Al) s, Fl = gy hvl (Bl) s, ER = gvR (AR) s, FR = gz hvR (BR) s,
In order to show soundness it is enough to proof soundness for Step 4 of the protocol.
To demonstrate soundness, we assume that some prover P  can execute the protocol
with a non-negligible success probability. An algorithm that uses P  as a subroutine
and extracts integer values k; l; R satisfying equation 1 is shown below.
By assumption on P , using standard rewinding techniques, there is a situation,
for a given PK, P  could answer for two dierent challenges s and s0 the values
(x; y; z; vk; vl; vR) and (x
0; y0; z0; v0k; v
0
l; v
0
R). Dividing the equations, hereunder is the
resulting one.
(2) gs s
0
= (cu)
x x0Cy y
0
hz z
0
Furthermore, since the values Ak; Bk; Ek; Fk; Al; Bl; El; Fl; AR; BR; ER; FR are de-
ned in the rst step of Step 4, they will be the same in both executions of the
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protocol. Dividing the corresponding verication equations (b),(d) and (f), we
obtain:
gvk v
0
k = As s
0
k g
vl v0l = As s
0
l g
vk v0k = As s
0
k
Since all the equations follow the same pattern, it will only be proved for the case
of Ak. Applying Lemma 2 from Chapter 2, under the strong RSA assumption it
can be concluded, that s  s0 must divide vk   v0k, meaning that k = vk v
0k
s s0 is an
integer.
Afterwards the same will happen for the verication equations (c),(e),(g). Again we
consider one of the cases, (the other two are analogous): dividing the two instances
of equation (c) we obtain.
gx x
0  hv k v0 k = Bs s0k
From the previous case, vk   v0k can be replaced by k(s  s0) and below it can be
seen the resulting equation.
gx x
0
= (
Bk
hk
)s s
0
Applying again Lemma 2 from Chapter 2, it can be concluded that s   s0 divides
x  x0, hence x = x x0s s0 is an integer number.
The same steps will be carried for the cases of l and R, and nally it will be inferred
that x  x0 as well as y   y0 and z   z0 can be divided by s  s0, which means that
there are integers k = x =
x x0
s s0 , l =
y y0
s s0 , R =
z z0
s s0 , such that g = (cu)
kClhR,
which completes the soundness proof. ut
Let us now show that the probability that a prover can pass its verication is neg-
ligible if u 2 L.
Since this new proof has the soundness property, and the same happens with the
zero-knowledge part of the Attribute-based signature scheme, a successful signature
will mean that the signer knows integers k; l; R; u; r such that:
ckuC
l = ghR cu = g
uhrmodN
From the two previous equations,
gkuhkrgl
Qn
i=1 ei = ghRmodN
That is to say the prover knows integers ku+ l
Qn
i=1 ei   1 and kr  R such that
gku+l
Qn
i=1 ei 1hkr R = 1modN
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with an overwhelmingly large probability. In order to make the proof easier, a; b
are dened as a = ku + l
Qn
i=1 ei   1 and b = kr   R. Therefore, three dierent
cases are considered:
 b = 1: If the exponent of h equals 1, the discrete logarithm problem assump-
tion would be broken, thus arriving to a contradiction.
 b > 1, the value d is dened as d = gcd(a; b). If d > 1, then the following
equation will hold,
(ga
0
hb
0
)d = 1modN
and the Strong RSA problem would be solved, thus breaking the strong RSA
assumption for x = 1, hence arriving to a contradiction.
 From the previous cases, it can be deduced that d = 1, the Bezout's identity
is applied to a; b, there are ;  such that a + b = 1, applying Lemma 1
from Chapter 2, the following equation is obtained
g = (h g)b
Therefore breaking the strong RSA assumption for x = g as a consequence
another contradiction is found.
As a result of the previous cases, the only option left is that b = 0, thus a must be
equal to 0 modulus the order of the exponent which is pq. If a = ku+l
Qn
i=1 ei 1 =
0mod pq, and the value u satises u = eI where 1  I  n, then
1 = keI + l
nY
i=1
ei = eI(k + l
I 1Y
i=1
ei
nY
i=I+1
ei)mod pq
Ergo two dierent numbers would be obtained, one being the inverse of the other,
which would enable to nd pq with high probability, and from pq and N , N could
be factorized, thus arriving to a contradiction, so u =2 L ut
This new method requires fewer elements than the polynomial evaluation argument
and the length of the proof is xed, and there are no longer the inconveniences of
accumulators protocols. This method seems at rst sight more ecient than the
previous one, which will be proved in the next chapter, where the two methods will
be compared.

Chapter 8
Eciency Analysis
Finally in this chapter, after explaining and adapting both revocation protocols
in Chapters 5 and 7 respectively for the particular RSA attribute-based signature
scheme explained in Chapter 4, an analysis of eciency and comparison between
both methods will be carried.
First of all, a description of how to exactly incorporate the revocation protocol into
the signature scheme will be done for both protocols. Afterwards the corresponding
eciency analysis in terms of cost of communications will be performed for both
revocation protocols. Our main goal was to design and choose the most ecient
protocol to remove users that have misbehaved or that have lost their attributes.
The major problem consists in maintaining privacy, a user who wants to prove that
he is not in the revocation list, can not just show his serial number and its cor-
responding non-membership witness, because the user will be revealing his serial
number. In both protocols, the user will prove in zero-knowledge that his serial
number is not in the revocation list.
1. Incorporating Revocation based on the Polyno-
mial Evaluation Argument into the Signature Scheme
With the aid of this protocol, the user will be able to prove that he is not in
the revocation list without revealing his secret value e, the user will just need to
prove that the result of the polynomial evaluation argument is dierent from 0, as
he is not revoked. Hereunder a description of the additions to the original RSA
attribute-based signature scheme can be observed.
Setup: In the RSA attribute-based signature, the master entity chooses N = PQ,
P = 2p+1 and Q = 2q+1. The public parameters are pms = (; 1; 2; ;; ;N; g;
H0;H1; q
0; ~P) and the master secret key is msk = (P;Q). Additionally, since the
polynomial evaluation argument is developed in a dierent group, the following
values must be added to the public parameters: G, a group of order ~p, where ~p
is a prime at least 1 + 2 + 1 bits, ~g and ~h. Furthermore, the revocation list
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L = fe1;    ; eDg will be required to be publicly available.
KeyGen: In our signature, we take as input an identity id, a subset of attributes
S  ~P satised by id, the master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
The master entity chooses at random a prime number e, and the global secret key
(skid;S = (e; fskigati2S)) is computed. The value e, is the number that it is used to
prove that the user is not revoked, and corresponds to the value u in Chapter 5.
Sign and Verify: (m;P; `; skid;S ; pms).The signature consists of a zero-knowledge
non-interactive proof of knowledge of an integer e and at least ` e-th roots modulo
N of the values H(at1); : : : ; H(atn). In addition, the prover proves to the verier
that e is not in the revocation list. Following the steps described in Chapter 5,
rst the prover commits his value e in cu = ~g
u~hr, and then proves that it is the
same as the value committed in the element B of the signature, and in the second
step proves that the polynomial is dierent from 0, hence the value is not in the
revocation list L.
Revocation: If we want to revoke a user, the master entity must add his value u
to the current revocation list L = fe1;    ; eDg, the resulting revocation list will be
L = fe1;    ; eD; ug.
2. Incorporating Revocation based on the protocol
for special applications into the Signature Scheme
Incorporating revocation with this new protocol will be easier than the previous
one since the proof is in the same group as the RSA attribute-based signature and
less elements need to be added. This protocol is based on the concept that as all
the revoked values are prime numbers, we will only need to proof in zero-knowledge
that the secret value of the user e satises the Bezout's identity with the product
of the revoked numbers.
Setup: In the RSA attribute-based signature, the master entity chooses N = PQ,
P = 2p+1 and Q = 2q+1. The public parameters are pms = (; 1; 2; ;; ;N; g;
H0;H1; q
0; ~P) and the master secret key is msk = (P;Q). In this case, only the re-
vocation list L = fe1;    ; eDg must be added to the public parameters.
KeyGen: In our signature, we take as input an identity id, a subset of attributes
S  ~P satised by id, the master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
The master entity chooses at random a prime number e, and the global secret key
(skid;S = (e; fskigati2S)) is computed. The value e, is the number that it is used to
prove that the user is not revoked, also corresponds to the value designated as u in
Chapter 6.
Sign and Verify: (m;P; `; skid;S ; pms).The signature consists of a zero-knowledge
non-interactive proof of knowledge of an integer e and at least ` e-th roots modulo
N of the values H(at1); : : : ; H(atn). In addition, the prover proves to the verier
that e is not in the revocation list following the steps described in Chapter 6. Since
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all the proof work in the same group QRN , the commitment named cu in Chapter
6 corresponds to the commitment B from the RSA attribute-based signature, and
the proof can be done with this value.
Revocation: If we want to revoke a user, the master entity must add his value u
to the current revocation list L = fe1;    ; eDg, the resulting revocation list will be
L = fe1;    ; eD; ug.
3. Eciency
At last, it is essential to assess the eciency of both resulting signatures schemes.
In order to do that, with the choice of the parameters given in [18], the growth in
the length of the signature in either cases will be determined. For a security level
of  = 1024, the parameters used are 1 = 1080, 2 = 800 and  = 160. It must be
noted that, although in the previous Chapters 5 and 7, the proofs in zero-knowledge
were interactive, but when executing the protocol now, as part of the attribute-
based signature scheme, a non-interactive method must be enlisted, thus a hash
function will be used instead. Described below are the resulting non-interactive
protocols of step 1 from Chapter 5, and step 4 from Chapter 7. Subsequently the
communication cost of each revocation protocol will be assessed.
3.1. Protocol 1: Polynomial evaluation argument. Firstly, it is explained
how the non-interactive version of step 1 and step 2 works.
Step 1: The prover proves to the verier that the value committed in B in bases
(g; h) is the same as the value committed in cu in bases (~g; ~h):
PKf(u; s; r) : B = guhs ^ cu = ~gu~hrg
(1) The prover chooses y 2 [0; 2(1+2+)], 1; 2 2 [0; 2(2+)] at random and
computes Y1 = g
yh1 and Y2 = ~g
y~h2 .
(2) The prover computes z = H(Y1; Y2; B; cu) where z 2 [0; 2].
(3) The prover computes x = y + zu, w1 = 1 + zs and w2 = 2 + zr and sends
(z; x; w1; w2).
(4) The verier checks whether:
z = H(gxhw1B z; ~gx~hw2(cu) z; B; cu)
Step 2: Pick t1; t2  Z~p, v = P (u), w = v 1 are computed, the commitments
cv = ~g
v~ht1 , cw = ~g
w~ht2 are calculated. The prover proves to the verier that v 6= 0.
PKf(v; w; t1; t2) : cv = ~gv~ht1 ^ cw = ~gw~ht2g
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(1) The prover chooses ;  2 [0; 2(1+2+)], 1; 2 2 [0; 2(2+)] and 3 2
[0; 2(1+2+2+)] at random and computes Y1 = ~g
~h1 , Y2 = ~g
~h2 and
Y3 = (cw)
~h3 .
(2) The prover computes z = H(Y1; Y2; Y3; cv; cw) where z 2 [0; 2].
(3) The prover computes  1 = + zv,  2 =  + zw, 1 = 1 + zt1, 2 = 2 + zt2,
3 = 3   zt2 and sends (z;  1;  2; 1; 2; 3) to the verier.
(4) The verier checks that:
z = H(~g 1~h1(cv)
 z; ~g 2~h2(cw) z; (cw) 1~h3g z; cv; cw)
The communication cost of step 1 is 6616 bits and four additional exponentiations
will be needed for the prover to perform this step. In the case of step 2, the cost
of communication is 12744 bits and ve exponentiations are required in this step.
These two steps determine the xed cost of the protocol, as step 3 of the protocol
(polynomial evaluation argument) depends on the number of revoked values. This
xed cost of communication sums 19360 bits and 9 exponentiations are needed.
Furthermore, the communication size of the polynomial evaluation argument for a
degree D = 2d+1 polynomial is approximately 4d elements from G and 3d elements
from Z~p elements. The cost of representing in bits an element of G is the same one
as an element of Z~p. Since ~p has to be greater than 21 +22 +1, hence log ~p, which
is the length in bits, will be at least 1 + 2 + 1 = 1881 bits. The total cost of step
3 is determined by the formula 4 logDG+ 3 logDZ~p = 13167 logD.
3.2. Protocol 2: Special applications. First of all, a non-interactive version of
step 4 of the protocol can be seen below.
Step 4: The prover proves to the verier that he knows secret integers k; l; R such
that
g = ckuC
lh RmodN
(1) In order to achieve soundness the following values rk; rl; rR are added and
the equations Bk = g
khrk , Ak = g
rk , Bl = g
lhrl , Al = g
rl , BR = g
RhrR ,
AR = g
rR must be dened. Then the prover chooses ;  2 [0; 2(1+2+)],
 2 [0; 2(1+2+2+)], k; l; R 2 [0; 2(2+)] at random and computes Y =
cuC
h , Ek = gk , Fk = ghk , El = gl , Fl = ghl , ER = gR and
FR = g
hR .
(2) The prover computes
s = H(Y;Ek; Fk; El; Fl; ER; FR; Ak; Bk; Al; Bl; AR; BR)
where s 2 [0; 2].
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(3) The prover computes x =  + sk, y =  + sl, z =  + sR, vk = k + srk,
vl = l + srl and vR = R + srR and sends
(s; x; y; z; vk; vl; vR; Ak; Bk; Al; Bl; AR; BR)
(4) The verier checks that
s = H(cxuC
yh zg s; gvk  (Ak) s; gx  hvk  (Bk) s; gvl  (Al) s;
gy  hvl  (Bl) s; gvR  (AR) s; gz  hvR  (BR) s)
The communication cost of this particular step is 21096 bits and 9 additional expo-
nentiations will be needed for the prover to perform this step. Since the other steps
do not entail any additional cost of communication, the total cost of communica-
tion of this second protocol is 21096 bits and the number of exponentiations only
increases to 10, because we can use the commitment B = gehr from the original
ABS as the value cu.
3.3. Comparison between both revocation protocols. After determining the
cost of communication for both protocols, hereunder in Table 1 can be seen the
results. Moreover, it must be noted that protocol 1 depends on the size of the
revocation list, contrary to protocol 2.
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
19360 + 13167 logD bits 21096 bits
Table 1. Cost of revocation.
From the table above 1 it is clear that protocol 2 is more ecient than protocol
1, as the xed cost of communication from protocol 1 is almost the whole cost
of revocation of protocol 2. Already with a single revoked user, D = 1, the com-
munication cost of Protocol 1 would be 32:527 bits, bigger than that of Protocol 2.
4. Analysis of eciency of Protocol 2
As seen in the previous section, the most ecient revocation method was protocol
2. Right away, this protocol will be assessed against the original RSA attribute-
based signature scheme. The original attribute-based signature scheme for a (`; n)-
threshold signing policy with n = jPj attributes has an approximate length of
6800n + 3200   160` bits. The cost of each execution of the signing protocol is
dominated by 10n exponentiations modulo N . Since the length of the signature
depends on the number of attributes and the revocation of users is independent of
it, implementing revocation of users might not be ecient for a small number of
attributes, but it could be ecient for larger signing policies, with a larger num-
ber of attributes. In Table 2 below, the length of the attribute-based signatures
is included, with and without the revocation extension, for dierent values of the
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number n of attributes of the signing policy, as well as the percentage increase of
length of the signatures. The results in Table 2 give an idea about how much does
it cost, at least in terms of communication cost, to add revocation to this particular
attribute-based signature.
n Approx. Kbit of ABS Protocol 2 + ABS Increasing %
5 34000 55096 62%
10 68000 89096 31%
15 102000 123096 20.7%
20 136000 157096 15.5%
30 204000 225096 10.3%
50 340000 361096 6.2%
75 510000 531096 4.1%
100 680000 701096 3.1%
Table 2. Length of each ABS [18] with and without revocation
for Protocol 2.
Comparing this results with the results obtained in [15], where other protocol orig-
inally developed by Li et al. [19] was considered to achieve a non-membership
proof, the cost of communication has been reduced by 58% as it can be seen in
Table 3, with an additional analysis of the reduction of the length of the resulting
attribute-based signature scheme.
Furthermore, in the case of [15] the revoked list was private on the contrary to
Protocol 2, this fact entails the necessity of a trusted third party online that would
update secretly every user, every time there is a new update of the revoked list L,
which is eliminated in the case of Protocol 2.
Cost of Procotol 1 Cost of Protocol
2
Cost of [15]
Protocol
Best reduction
%
19360+13167 logD 21096 bits 50000 bits 58%
Table 3. Comparing the communication cost of dierent revoca-
tion protocols
As it can be seen in Table 4, the eect of the new protocol is considerable in small
and medium size policies.
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n ABS + Protocol 2 ABS + [15] Total ABS Reduction%
5 55096 84000 34.4%
10 89096 118000 24.5%
15 123096 152000 19%
20 157096 186000 15.5%
30 225096 254000 11.4%
50 361096 390000 7.4%
75 531096 560000 5.5%
100 701096 730000 4%
Table 4. Comparing the length of attribute-based signatures with revocation.

Chapter 9
Conclusions
In this project, the main goal was to assess dierent revocation methods and nd the
most suitable for incorporating revocation of users into an existing RSA attribute-
based signature scheme.
Having already developed a revocation method in [15], the concepts of the attribute-
based signature and a number of mathematical concepts and assumptions which
are essential in attribute-based cryptography were already known, but the previous
revocation method relied on the concept of accumulators, which might sustain a
number of disadvantages. For example, the necessity of a master entity that up-
dates the accumulator and provides the user with a non-membership witness, which
had to be updated every time a new member was revoked.
Hence, so as to nd a more appropriate revocation protocol, a substantial number
of papers were read and analyzed in order to nd the most ecient ones, which
are the two methods fully described in this project. The main mathematical ob-
jects, cryptographic assumptions and concepts used in this project are described in
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Since we did not want to rely on accumulators and a trusted third party, the method
developed in Chapter 5 was technically the most ecient one that could be found
in the literature, as it has a communication complexity of O(logD), where D is the
size of the revocation list; other methods such as the ones developed by Brands,
Demuynck and De Decker [5], Peng [24] developed non-membership proofs with
communication complexity to O(pD) group elements. This method consisted of
a polynomial evaluation protocol developed by Bayer and Groth [4], which was
adapted to satisfy the needs of the attribute-based signature scheme.
After incorporating the previous revocation method, it was compared with the one
developed in [15], and it was noted that in our particular attribute-based signature
scheme the security of the signature would enable us to make public the revoked list
L = fe1;    ; eng. Thus a trusted third party would not be required anymore as the
accumulated value C = ge1e2en modN can be calculated by the user, facilitating
the revocation method, and eliminating the need of a master entity that updates
the accumulator or the witnesses . A new protocol described by Peng and Bao [23]
was found that works in the case where the revoked elements satised the loosened
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coprime condition, in our case, all the revoked elements are prime numbers, so a
number of modications of the protocol where made to adapt it to our attribute
based signature scheme. Later on, it was found that the Peng and Bao protocol
[23] was not sound and the protocol was not secure, even more an explicit attack
against the soundness property was described in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the Peng
and Bao protocol was modied in order to be secure, and also additional modica-
tions were build to simplify the method because all the revoked elements are prime
numbers in our attribute based-signature scheme, thus resulting in an even more
ecient revocation scheme. Summing up, a more ecient and simple revocation
mechanism was found that can be applied to our attribute-based signature scheme.
Finally, once both protocols were developed and explained, the eciency of both
these protocols was analyzed, in particular for the case of the communication cost,
or in other words the length of the resulting complete attribute-based signatures.
From the table at the end of Chapter 8, it can be observed that the second protocol,
the one developed in Chapter 7 is more ecient, as the cost of communication is
lesser than the cost of the polynomial evaluation protocol even in the case of only
one revoked user. It must be noted that the revocation scheme of Chapter 7 can be
applied to our particular attribute-based signature, but in other signature schemes
(for instance, those based on pairings in groups of public and prime order) the situ-
ation could be dierent, and other non-membership protocols should be considered.
An analysis of the computational complexity, that is, the time required to verify a
signature, could be done essentially in the same way, and the conclusions would be
almost identical.
At last, I would like to say that this has been an excellent learning experience
and I am satised with the results from studying dierent revocation protocols
and nding and adapting the most ecient one for the necessities of the existing
attribute-based signature scheme. Although one of our initial goals was to imple-
ment the revocation protocol of Chapter 5, we were able to nd a more ecient
and simple one, even with the additional work that supposed the security problem
of the original protocol developed by Peng and Bao [23] and the necessity to design
a new secure protocol. As a possibility for future work, it would be very interesting
to implement and test the resulting attribute-based signature scheme, including the
revocation features provided in this work.
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